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CASES NOTED
Circumventing The Exclusionary Zoning Problem
Through Exclusionary Standing
On January 24, 1972, eight individuals composed of Rochester,
New York area residents and taxpayers, and Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., a non-profit corporation interested in the local low and
moderate income housing shortage, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York. Two other
groups, Housing Council (a non-profit corporation interested in
housing problems) and Rochester Home Builders Association (an
association of residential construction firms) sought to join as party
plaintiffs.' The defendants were the Town of Penfield, a municipality adjacent to Rochester, and the town's Zoning, Planning and
Town Boards. Plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's zoning ordinance, on
its face' and as applied, 3 effectively excluded persons of low and
moderate income from living in the town, in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights.' The plaintiffs alleged various personal injuries as the result of the town's allegedly exclusionary ordinance.' Faced with the sensitive situation of nonresidents attacking
the validity of a town's zoning law, the district court dismissed the
action. The court held, inter alia, that the original plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue, and that Home Builders and Housing Council
1. Plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343
(civil rights action).
2. The ordinance allocated 98 percent of the town's vacant land to single family detached
housing and imposed minimum size and area building requirements which allegedly made
the cost of such housing prohibitive for low and moderate income families. Only 0.3 percent
of the available residential land was allocated to multi-family structures, and plaintiffs
alleged that low density and other requirements made low and moderate income housing
economically unfeasible on this land.
3. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that defendant members of the zoning board had unreasonably delayed and arbitrarily denied action on proposals for low and moderate income
housing and had amended the ordinance to make approval of such projects virtually impossible.
4. Plaintiffs claimed violations of their first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment rights
and of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (equal rights under the law), 1982 (property rights of citizens), and
1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights).
5. The low and moderate income plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's exclusionary zoning
practices forced them to live in less attractive surroundings. The taxpayer plaintiffs alleged
they paid higher taxes because Penfield's ordinance forced Rochester to provide more low and
moderate income housing.
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lacked standing to intervene. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.7 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, affirmed: Where individuals or associations who are not residents of a municipality seek to attack that municipality's zoning
law on the basis that it excludes persons of low and moderate income, such parties must allege facts which clearly demonstrate a
real, specific injury that is capable of relief by judicial intervention,
to satisfy both the article III and prudential aspects of the standing
doctrine. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
The problem which the petitioners brought before the Court is
exclusionary or "snob" zoning. This has been defined to include
"those controls which appear to interfere seriously with the availability of low- and moderate- cost housing where it is needed." The
problems created by such zoning laws have reached substantial proportions in recent years, due to the population increase and the fact
that most of the land available for residential use is in the suburbs.'
The judicial response to challenges of allegedly exclusionary ordinances has been largely unfavorable,'" and many courts have evidenced a genuine dislike of zoning litigation."
One expression of this judicial attitude can be seen in the rigid
standing requirements usually present in zoning litigation. 2 Generally, a party bringing suit must have some legal or equitable interest
in the zoned land, 3 and must allege specific personal injury. If a
party has no interest in the land, he must show some specific harm
6. The court also held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, and that the suit should not proceed as a class action.
7. Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern
New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 478-79 (1971).
9. Comment, A Survey of Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 537, 537-61 (1971).
10. See Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions: -Restricted Access to the State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
598 (1971). See also, Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210, 1218-20 (1973).
11. 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 598, supra note 10, at 611. The Supreme Court has not heard a
zoning case since 1928; see Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection,84 HARV. L. REV.
1645, 1648, n. 27 (1971).
12. Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects
of Zoning Fragmentation,24 VAND. L. REV. 341, 354 (1971).
13. Id. at 355. Contra, Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (while issue not raised, the court noted nonresidents who wished
to secure low cost housing would have standing to challenge a municipality's zoning ordinance). But see Annot. 48 A.L.R. 3d. 1210, 1227 (1973). See also 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 598,
supra note 10, at 601.
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which differs from that suffered by his neighbors. 4 Standing, in its
prudential aspects,' is a valuable discretionary tool for the courts."
When a presumptively valid 7 zoning law is challenged it permits
the court, in effect, to sustain the law without going to the merits.
In Warth v. Seldin, the majority chose to apply these strict
standards, rather than the more liberal requirements adopted in
other forms of constitutional litigation. 8 Foremost among these requisites is the demonstration of some judicially cognizable interest in
the zoned land, coupled with an actual or threatened concrete injury. In cases cited by petitioners in which exclusionary ordinances
were invalidated," these or other mitigating factors were present. 0
14. See 24 VAND. L. REV., supra note 12, at 355.
15. Mr. Justice Powell explains that the standing inquiry involves both constitutional
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, and prudential limitations on its exercise. The constitutional limitation involves the "case or controversy" requirement of article III. The question is whether plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy"
as to warrant his invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 95 S. Ct. at 2205.
Apart from constitutional requirements, Justice Powell states that the Court has recognized other limitations on the class of persons who may invoke the power of the courts. For
example, when the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance," exercise of jurisdiction is
normally not warranted. Also, even where a plaintiff has alleged sufficient injury to meet
constitutional requirements, the Court has held that plaintiff must assert his own legal rights,
and not those of third parties. Justice Powell described these limitations as "matters of
judicial self-governance" which enable the Court to avoid being called on to decide abstract
questions of great public significance when other governmental institutions may be more
competent to address the questions, and judicial intervention is unnecessary to protect individual rights. Id.at 2205-06.
16. See, e.g., how standing requirements are relaxed in civil rights cases such as Barrow
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also
Comment, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256
(1971). For a brief general background of standing, see the noted case, 95 S. Ct. at 2205-07.
17. In deference to the legislative origin of zoning ordinances, the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) stated that where
their validity is "fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." This
statement was translated by the courts into a presumption of validity and continues to
influence zoning cases to this day.
18. See Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 896-98 (D.D.C. 1974),
for an outline of the development of standing rules up to the liberal standard of United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 699 (1973), discussed infra note 30 and text accompanying.
19. United Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City
of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City
of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
For other cases in accord, see Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of
Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. III. 1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv.
Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
20. All of the cases cited in note 19 supra, involved at least one plaintiff with a recognized
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The facts of Warth reveal that all of the petitioners were
nonresidents and had no legal or equitable interest in land in Penfield.' Given these circumstances, and a background of the traditionally strict standing requirements in such cases, the Court's holding is perhaps not surprising.
The taxpayer petitioners alleged that their taxes were higher
than necessary because Penfield's zoning law required nearby Rochester to provide more low and moderate income housing. The Court
held that the connection between this injury and its alleged cause
was too tenuous to warrant standing, and that the taxpayers' claim
amounted to the assertion of the rights of third parties, who could
sue in their own right.22 The Court had, however, already dismissed
the claims of these third parties-the low and moderate income
petitioners and Metro-Act. The majority held that these parties had
failed to allege any concrete personal injury which judicial interven23
tion could relieve.
Metro-Act had also claimed standing because 9 percent of its
members lived in Penfield and were deprived of a racially and ethnically integrated community as a result of the exclusion of low and
moderate income persons. The Court indicated that while Congress
could by statute confer standing in the absence of a judicially cognizable injury, no such statute was applicable here. 24 The Court
further said that, assuming arguendo an injury sufficient to satisfy
article III requirements, Metro-Act was attempting to raise the
rights of third parties, and prudential considerations counselled
25
against according Metro-Act standing.
With regard to Home Builders, the organization composed of
residential construction firms, the Court said it could have standing
interest in land. In many of them, discrimination based on race was also alleged.
21. The Court indicates this fact at several points in the opinion. See 95 S. Ct. at 2208,
2211.
22. 95 S. Ct. at 2210.
23. The Court's reasoning is, apparently, that a decision for petitioners would do nothing
to reduce high purchase and rental prices already in force in Penfield. The majority did not
consider, possibly, that lower priced housing would almost certainly be available if low and
moderate income housing were permitted to be built through the Court's intervention.
24. The Court distinguished Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972), where plaintiffs claiming, inter alia, lost social benefits as a result of racial discrimination were held to have standing. The distinguishing factor was that the plaintiffs had sued
under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which the Court said had conferred upon
them standing to sue.
25. Id. at 2213.
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only if it had alleged facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy if the suit had been brought by its members themselves. As
there had been no allegation that any member had been denied a
building permit or variance or had been in any way thwarted or
delayed regarding any current project, it had failed to show the
existence of any injury to its members of sufficient immediacy and
ripeness to warrant judicial intervention."
Similar analysis was employed in denying the original plaintiffs' motion to join Housing Council as a party plaintiff. However, one of Housing Council's member groups, Penfield Better
Homes Corporation, had been denied a zoning variance in 1969.
While indicating that it was possible that Penfield Better Homes or
Housing Council would have had standing to seek review in 1969,
the Court said that there was no evidence that the project remained
a viable, concrete dispute when the complaint was filed in 1972, and
therefore denied the motion.27
If the Court's reasoning seems strained or circular at times, it
may be due tothe majority's efforts to wedge each of the petitioners
into some category which would keep him out of the courtroom. The
majority's opinion may have been motivated by the acknowledged
reluctance of the judiciary to interfere in zoning cases. It may have
been motivated by fear that a flood of constitutional challenges
would be instituted by persons of lower income who might be unable
to secure satisfactory housing in any given community. Whatever
the policy basis for the majority's decision in Warth, it seems that
the holding should properly be considered as limited to the facts of
the case: that is, where non-residents of a lower income group seek
to challenge the zoning law of a municipality in which they hold no
real estate interest, and where organizations challenge the law when
no viable dispute exists between their members and the municipality.
Since Warth exemplifies the strict standing requirements commonly applied to similar fact situations, it should not be considered
a step backward in general standing requirements. A recent federal
case"6 has traced the development of standing thresholds," and
26. Id. at 2214.
27. Id. at 2214-15.
28. Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
29. The Schultz case traces standing requirements from the strict "legal interest" test
of Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) to the two-pronged "injury in fact"
and "zone of protected interests" test of Association of Data Processing Serv, Organizations,
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notes that United States v. SCRAP" exemplifies the most recent
and most liberal. According to this interpretation of SCRAP, once
a party has shown that he is among those actually injured by the
challenged law, standing will not be denied because many others
suffer the same wrong, :" nor because of an attenuated line of causation between the challenged law and the alleged injury,32 nor because of a relatively small personal stake in the outcome.33 It is
certainly arguable that a different result could have been reached
in Warth if these standards had been applied.
By the same token, Warth should not be read as a judicial
endorsement of exclusionary zoning. It merely shows that the majority was not ready to deal with the question of nonresident challenges
to zoning laws, and chose the vehicle of a strict interpretation of
standing requirements to avoid it. Where these requirements have
been met, other courts have struck down exclusionary ordinances.34
The 5-4 division in the Warth case may also be indicative of changing judicial attitudes toward strict procedural rules which prevent
courts from reaching questions of importance and interest.
The traditional laissez-faire attitude of the majority of courts
confronted with exclusionary zoning cases, has led to a great deal
of commentary. Authors have advocated the extension of standing
to nonresidents, :" and have drawn attention to the larger regional
issues which may be present in such cases.3 " The legislative branch
has also taken notice of the problem. 7 The attention of the courts
in these cases might well be directed back to language in Euclid."
There the court stated that their sanction of zoning did not "exclude
the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so
far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality
could not be permitted to stand in the way. ' 39
ROBERT SOBODA
Inc. v. Camp, :397 U.S. 150 (1970) to the more recent and more liberal test of United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), discussed infra note 30 and text accompanying.
30. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
31. Id. at 687-88.
:32.
Id. at 688.
33.Id. at 689 and n.14.
:34. See cases cited in note 19 supra.
:35.
See 24 VAND. L. REv. 341, supra note 12.
:36. Id. at 347-49.
:17.
See. e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 40B § 20 (1970 Supp.), the Massachusetts "AntiSnob Zoning Law" and the judicial application in Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing
Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E. 2d 393 (1973).
38. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 17 supra.
:39. ld. at 390.

